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Wittgenstein’s	  Picture	  Theory	  of	  Pictures	  
Enrico	  Terrone	  
1.	  Objects	  as	  Qualia	  	  
In	  his	  papers	  On	  the	  Nature	  of	  Tractatus	  Objects	  (2004)	  and	  An	  Adequacy	  Condition	  for	  
the	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  Ontology	   (2010)	  Pasquale	  Frascolla	  ([2004]:	  369)	  ar-­‐
gues	   for	   «the	   identification	   of	  Tractatus	   objects	  with	   qualia,	   i.e.	  with	   repeatable	   phe-­‐
nomenal	  qualities	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Goodman’s	  The	  Structure	  of	  Appearance».	  Hence	  Trac-­‐
tatus	  objects	  have	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  «abstract	  entities	  (universals),	  whose	  instances	  
appear	  in	  the	  stream	  of	  phenomena»	  ([2004]:	  370).	  According	  to	  Frascolla	  ([2004]:	  374),	  
Tractatus	  objects	  are	  not	  substances	  existing	  necessarily,	  that	  is,	  existing	  at	  every	  possi-­‐
ble	  world.	  By	  contrast,	  «objects,	  as	  repeatable	  phenomenal	  qualities,	  are	  abstract	  enti-­‐
ties,	   whereas	   existence,	   within	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   the	   Tractatus,	   is	   strictly	  
confined	  to	  minimal	  concrete	  complexes	  or	  states	  of	  affairs».	  Therefore	  existence	  does	  
not	   concern	   objects	   but	   states	   of	   affairs,	   conceived	   by	   Frascolla	   ([2004]:	   374)	   as	   phe-­‐
nomenal	   complexes	   «which	   can	   be	   analyzed	   in	   repeatable	   qualitative	   parts	   (qualia,	   in	  
Goodman’s	  sense)».	  	  
To	   sum	   up,	   objects,	   as	   abstract	   qualia,	   constitute	   states	   of	   affairs	   as	   phenomenal	  
complexes	   that	   compose	   «the	   stream	   of	   phenomena,	   what	   is	   perceived,	   the	   given»	  
([2004]:	  374).	  	  
If	  we	  consider	  just	  the	  visual	  experience,	  then	  an	  atomic	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  a	  «minimal	  
concrete	  visual	  complex»	  that	  «can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  constituent	  qualitative	  parts:	  a	  
phenomenal	   time,	  a	   visual-­‐field	  place	  and	  a	  phenomenal	   colour»	   ([2004]:	  374).	   In	   this	  
scope,	  Tractatus	  objects	  are	  chromatic	  qualia	  (phenomenal	  colour),	  spatial	  qualia	  (visu-­‐
al-­‐field	  place),	  and	  temporal	  qualia	  (phenomenal	  time),	  while	  an	  atomic	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  
the	  combination	  of	  a	  given	  chromatic	  quale,	  a	  given	  spatial	  quale	  and	  a	  given	  temporal	  
quale.	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So	  conceived,	  objects	   satisfy	   the	   following	  «adequacy	  conditions»	   for	   the	  Tractatus	  
ontology	  (cf.	  Frascolla	  [2010]):	  
I)	  Objects	  are	  colourless	  and,	  by	  a	  natural	  generalization,	  they	  are	  not-­‐spatial	  and	  time-­‐
less	  as	  well	  (cf.	  TLP	  2.0232),	  since	  only	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  (constituted	  by	  the	  combination	  
of	  a	  chromatic	  quale,	  a	  spatial	  quale	  and	  a	  temporal	  quale)	  has	  a	  color,	  whereas	  a	  object	  
is	  a	  color	  at	  most	  (in	  the	  case	  in	  which	  it	  is	  a	  chromatic	  quale).	  	  
II)	   Space	   and	   time	   are	   on	   a	   par	  with	   color	   as	   forms	   of	   objects	   (cf.	  TLP	  2.0251),	   since	  
space,	  time	  and	  color	  are	  categories,	  each	  of	  which	  collects	  objects	  (spatial	  qualia,	  tem-­‐
poral	  qualia,	  chromatic	  qualia),	  «all	  enjoying	  the	  same	  combinatorial	  possibilities»	  (Fras-­‐
colla	   [2004]:	  378).	   For	  example,	   the	  quale	  of	   red	   can	   combine	  with	  every	  place	   in	   the	  
visual	   field	   and	   with	   every	  moment	   in	   the	   phenomenal	   time	   to	   constitute	   an	   atomic	  
state	  of	  affairs,	  but	  it	  can	  not	  combine	  with	  the	  quale	  of	  green:	  its	  form	  does	  not	  allow	  
this	  combination.	  	  
III)	   The	   «Principle	   of	   Identity	   of	   Indiscernibles»	   does	   not	   hold	   of	   objects	   (TLP	   2.0233,	  
2.02331,	   5.5302),	   since	   two	   color	   qualia,	   for	   instance	   a	   red	   quale	   and	   a	   green	   quale,	  
share	  the	  same	  logical	  form	  –	  that	  is,	  color	  –	  and	  nevertheless	  they	  are	  different	  (one	  is	  
red,	   the	  other	   is	  green).	  Yet	   the	  Principle	  applies	   to	  states	  of	  affairs,	  which	  have	  to	  be	  
identical	  if	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  same	  combinations	  of	  objects:	  if	  two	  atomic	  visu-­‐
al	  complexes	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  time,	  visual-­‐field	  place	  and	  phe-­‐
nomenal	  color,	  then	  they	  must	  be	  the	  same	  visual	  complex.	  	  
2.	  Propositions	  as	  Pixels	  	  
According	   to	   the	   Tractatus,	   facts	   are	   existing	   states	   of	   affairs.	   Some	   facts	   are	   special	  
since	   they	   present	   other	   states	   of	   affairs.	   Wittgenstein	   calls	   these	   special	   facts	   «pic-­‐
tures»	   and	   claims	   that	   they	   are	   constituted	   by	  elements	   corresponding	   to	   the	   objects	  
that	   constitute	   the	  presented	  state	  of	  affairs.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  «The	  picture	  presents	  
the	   facts	   in	   logical	   space»	   (TLP	   2.11),	   namely,	   it	   presents	   the	   states	   of	   affairs.	  On	   the	  
other	  hand	  «The	  picture	  is	  a	  fact»	  (TLP	  2.141).	  	  
If	  we	  endorse	  Frascolla’s	   account,	   according	   to	  which	  objects	  are	   chromatic	  qualia,	  
spatial	   qualia	   and	   temporal	   qualia,	   then	   picture	   elements	   are	   signs	   of	   color,	   signs	   of	  
space	  and	  signs	  of	  time.	  In	  this	  sense	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  a	  Tractatus	  picture	  is	  a	  mov-­‐
ie	  composed	  by	  pixels.	  	  
I	  use	  the	  acronyms	  «pixel»	  to	  designate	  a	  pictorial	  unit	   independently	  of	  any	  digital	  
encoding	  of	  it.	   In	  this	  sense	  a	  pixel	  of	  a	  movie	  is	  an	  «atomic	  pictorial	  fact»	  (or,	   in	  Witt-­‐
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genstein’s	   terms,	   an	   elementary	   proposition)	   constituted	   by	   the	   combination	   of	   three	  
elements:	  a	  sign	  of	  colour,	  a	  sign	  of	  space	  and	  a	  sign	  of	  time.	  In	  a	  screened	  movie,	  the	  
pixel	  is	  itself	  an	  atomic	  fact	  F,	  that	  is,	  a	  visual	  complex	  constituted	  by	  a	  spatial	  quale	  S	  (a	  
certain	  position	  on	  the	  screen),	  a	  temporal	  quale	  T	  (a	  certain	   instant	   in	  the	  screening),	  
and	  a	  chromatic	  quale	  C	  (a	  certain	  screened	  color).	  Yet	  the	  pixel	  is	  more	  than	  this,	  since	  
its	  elements	  S	  and	  T	  respectively	  correspond	  to	  another	  spatial	  quale	  S’	  (a	  certain	  posi-­‐
tion	   in	  the	  depicted	  scene)	  and	  another	  temporal	  quale	  T’	   (a	  certain	   instant	   in	   the	  de-­‐
picted	  scene).	  Therefore	  the	   fact	  F	   (constituted	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  S,	  T	  and	  C)	  pre-­‐
sents	  another	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’	  (constituted	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  S’,	  T’	  and	  C).	  	  
So	  movies,	  and	  more	  generally	  pictures,	  are	  facts	  made	  by	  pixels.	  A	  static	  picture	  (a	  
picture	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense)	  is	  defective	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  movie	  since	  all	  its	  pixels	  can	  
present	  states	  of	  affairs	  having	  only	  one	  temporal	  quale	  T’	  while	  movies	  have	  pixels	  that	  
can	  present	  states	  of	  affairs	  having	  different	  temporal	  qualia	  T’,	  T’’,	  T’’’	  etc.	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   movie	   itself	   is	   a	   defective	   depiction	   since,	   as	   a	   fact,	   it	   is	   a	   two-­‐
dimensional	  surface	  so	  that	  its	  pixels	  just	  present	  spatially	  two-­‐dimensional	  visual	  com-­‐
plexes	  instead	  of	  the	  three-­‐dimensional	  ones	  composing	  the	  visual	  field.	  The	  ideal	  Trac-­‐
tarian	  picture	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  hologram	  made	  by	  pixels	  having	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  spatial	  el-­‐
ement.	  But	  movies	  (and	  even	  static	  pictures	   like	  photographs)	  can	  however	  be	  treated	  
as	  Tractarian	  pictures	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  present,	  although	  not	  a	  visual	  field	  as	  such,	  
an	  ersatz	  visual	  structure	  that	  can	  be	  experienced	  approximately	  like	  we	  experience	  our	  
visual	   field	  –	  a	  «quite	  competent»	  visual	  structure,	  according	  to	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  
projective	  geometry:	  	  
If	  we	  look	  at	  an	  object,	  say	  a	  tree,	  every	  (visible)	  point	  of	  it	  sends	  to	  the	  eye	  a	  ray	  which	  is	  
called	  the	  'projector,'	  or	  the	  'projecting	  ray'	  of	  this	  point.	  The	  projector	  of	  the	  whole	  tree	  is	  
compounded	  out	  of	  many	  rays,	  each	  of	  which	   'projects'	  one	  or	  more	  points	  to	  the	  eye	  […]	  
We	  can	  now	  intercept,	  or	  'intersect,'	  the	  projector	  of	  the	  tree	  by	  a	  plane,	  each	  projecting	  ray	  
being	  cut	  in	  a	  point	  […]	  By	  this	  means	  we	  obtain	  in	  the	  plane,	  as	  the	  'section'	  or	  'trace'	  of	  this	  
projector,	   a	   perspective	   picture,	   a	   'projection'	   of	   the	   tree,	   and	   this	   projection	   evidently	  
throws	  the	  same	  projector	  into	  the	  eye	  as	  the	  tree	  itself,	  and	  is	  therefore	  quite	  competent	  to	  
convey	  a	  notion	  of	  the	   latter	  to	  us.	  Ordinary	  photographs	  of	  three-­‐dimensional	  objects	  are	  
essentially	  such	  perspective,	  plane	  pictures	  of	  the	  objects	  (Reye	  [1898]:	  9-­‐10,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  
3.	  Pictures	  as	  Visual	  Structures	  
If	  we	  endorse	   Frascolla's	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Tractatus	   ontology,	   then	  Wittgenstein's	  
«picture	   theory	  of	  propositions»	   reveals	   to	  be	  a	  genuine	  depiction	   theory.	  Elementary	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propositions	  are	  indeed	  pixels,	  that	  is,	  the	  basic	  components	  of	  both	  static	  and	  moving	  
pictures,	  which	   are	   therefore	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   complex	   propositions	   composed	   by	  
logical	  conjunctions	  of	  pixels.	  	  
Certainly	  this	  is	  not	  a	  perceptual	  account	  of	  depiction	  like	  the	  ones	  that	  scholars	  like	  
Gombrich	   (1960)	  or	  Wollheim	   (1980)	  built	  by	  directly	   starting	   from	   the	   considerations	  
about	   «noticing	   aspects»	   in	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations.	   This	   is	   rather	   a	   theory	   of	  
depiction	   that	   reveals	   affinities	  with	   the	   structural	   accounts	   proposed	  by	   scholars	   like	  
Goodman	  (1968)	  and	  especially	  Haugeland	  (1991)	  and	  Kulvicki	  (2006).	  	  
According	  to	  structural	  accounts,	  there	  is	  a	  basic	  level	  at	  which	  what	  a	  picture	  depicts	  
does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  a	  competent	  viewer	  can	  recognize,	  but	  simply	  on	  the	  picture’s	  
structure.	   Haugeland	   calls	   this	   basic	   level	   «bare	   bone	   content»	   (complementary	   to	   a	  
«fleshed	  out	  content»	  in	  which	  the	  recognition	  takes	  place),	  and	  he	  claims	  that,	  at	  this	  
level,	   «all	   the	   photos	   ‘strictly’	   represent	   is	   certain	   variations	   of	   incident	   light	  with	   re-­‐
spect	  to	  direction»	  (Haugeland	  [1991]:	  189).	  	  
In	   order	   to	   relate	   Haugeland’s	   claim	   to	   our	   –	   so	   far	   outlined	   –	   picture	   theory,	   we	  
need,	  first	  of	  all,	  to	  relate	  the	  Goodmanian	  notion	  of	  phenomenal	  qualia	  (on	  which	  relies	  
our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  ontology)	  to	  the	  objective	  physical	  notion	  of	  «varia-­‐
tions	  of	   incident	   light	  with	  respect	  to	  direction»	  used	  by	  Haugeland.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  we	  
need	  to	  address	  what	  Goodman	  ([1968]:	  380)	  calls	  «the	  problem	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  
physical	   world	   upon	   a	   phenomenalist	   basis»,	   and	   David	   Chalmers	   (2006)	   effectively	  
characterizes	  as	  «the	  fall	  from	  Eden».	  	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  fall	  from	  the	  phenomenal	  Eden	  to	  the	  physical	  Earth,	  we	  
should	   treat	  our	   visual	   qualia	   (phenomenal	   times,	   visual-­‐field	  places,	   phenomenal	   col-­‐
ors)	  not	  only	  as	  Tractatus	  objects,	  but	  also	  as	  Tractatus	  elements	  corresponding	  to	  other	  
kinds	   of	   objects,	   namely,	   physical	   times,	   physical	   places,	   physical	  wavelengths.	  An	   en-­‐
lightening	   characterization	   of	   such	   a	   	   correspondence	   between	   phenomenal	   qualities	  
and	  physical	  properties	   is	  provided	  by	  one	  of	   the	   thinker	   that	  mostly	   influenced	  Witt-­‐
genstein's	  Tractatus,	  namely,	  Hermann	  von	  Helmholtz	  ([1878]:	  223-­‐224):	  
Schopenhauer	  and	  many	   followers	  of	  Kant	  have	  been	   led	   to	   the	   improper	   conclusion	   that	  
there	  is	  no	  real	  content	  at	  all	  in	  our	  space-­‐perceptions,	  that	  space	  and	  its	  relations	  are	  purely	  
transcendental	  and	  have	  nothing	  corresponding	  to	  them	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  real.	  We	  are,	  
however,	  justified	  in	  taking	  our	  space-­‐perceptions	  as	  signs	  of	  certain	  otherwise	  unknown	  re-­‐
lations	  in	  the	  world	  of	  reality,	  though	  we	  may	  not	  assume	  any	  sort	  of	  similarity	  between	  the	  
sign	  and	  what	  is	  signified.	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The	   correspondence	   between	   phenomenal	   qualities	   and	   physical	   properties	   allows	  
us	  to	  claim	  that	  pictures	  are	  visual	  propositions	  about	  light	  –	  better	  to	  say,	  about	  spatio-­‐
temporal	  distributions	  of	   light	  energy.	  What	  we	  ordinarily	   call	  «pictures'	   subjects»	  are	  
just	  interpretations	  (in	  Haugeland's	  terms:	  «fleshed	  out	  contents»)	  of	  these	  visual	  prop-­‐
ositions	  about	   light	   (in	  Haugeland's	   terms:	  «bare	  bones	  contents»).	  But	  our	  visual	  per-­‐
ceptions	   are	   in	   their	   turn	   visual	   propositions	   about	   light,	   and	   of	   a	  more	   fundamental	  
kind,	  so	  that	  pictures	  can	  be	  also	  conceived	  of	  –	  like	  we	  have	  done	  so	  far	  and	  we	  are	  go-­‐
ing	  to	  do	  in	  what	  follows	  –	  as	  propositions	  about	  the	  contents	  of	  our	  visual	  perceptions.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  pictures	  can	  count	  as	  propositions	  of	  this	  sort,	  let	  
us	   come	  back	   to	   the	  Tractatus.	   First	   of	   all,	   a	   picture	   is	   a	   fact,	   that	   is,	   an	   aggregate	  of	  
atomic	  visual	  complexes	  (atomic	  facts)	   in	  our	  visual	  field.	   In	  other	  words,	  a	  picture	   is	  a	  
surface	  perceived	  in	  our	  environment.	  Yet	  this	  surface	  has	  something	  special:	  it	  is	  com-­‐
posed	  by	  atomic	  facts	  constituted	  by	  elements.	  These	  atomic	  facts	  are	  pixels,	  that	  is,	  el-­‐
ementary	  propositions.	  The	  picture	  is	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  fact	  (i.e.,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  a	  sim-­‐
ple	  surface	  in	  our	  environment)	  since	  it	  is	  composed	  by	  pixels	  that	  are	  more	  than	  mere	  
atomic	  facts.	  	  
An	  atomic	  fact	  is	  something	  absolutely	  singular	  and	  concrete:	  a	  phenomenal	  color	  at	  
a	  given	  visual-­‐field	  place	  and	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  pixel	  has	  a	  distinctive	  
degree	   of	   abstractness,	   since	   it	   can	   be	   instantiated	   by	   different	   atomic	   facts	   (F1,	   F2,	  
F3…)	  in	  different	  visual-­‐field	  places	  and	  times,	  and	  nevertheless	  it	  still	  presents	  the	  same	  
atomic	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’,	   in	  which	  a	  certain	  screened	  color	  C	   is	  at	  a	  certain	  position	  S’	  
and	  time	  T’	  in	  the	  depicted	  scene.	  We	  can	  see	  the	  same	  picture	  in	  different	  moments	  of	  
our	  life	  and	  even	  at	  different	  places;	  nevertheless,	  it	  still	  presents	  the	  same	  visual	  struc-­‐
ture,	  since	  its	  pixels	  still	  present	  the	  same	  combinations	  of	  color,	  space	  and	  time.	  	  
That	  being	  the	  case,	  the	  pixels	  have	  a	  peculiar	  abstractness	  that	  is	   intermediate	  be-­‐
tween,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   concreteness	   and	   singularity	   of	   facts	   and,	   on	   the	   other	  
hand,	  the	  absolute	  abstractness	  of	  Tractatus	  objects	  conceived	  as	  «repeatable	  phenom-­‐
enal	  qualities».	  Pixels	  work	  as	  «repeatable	  phenomenal	  facts».	  They	  are	  not	  absolutely	  
repeatable	  like	  objects	  are,	  since	  at	  every	  new	  «repetition»	  of	  a	  pixel	  only	  the	  phenom-­‐
enal	  color	  remains	  the	  same	  whereas	  there	  is	  a	  new	  phenomenal	  time	  and	  probably	  also	  
a	  new	  visual-­‐field	  place.	  Hence	  there	  is	  a	  new	  fact.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  pixels	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  repeatable	  since	  –	  although	  their	  spatial	  and	  
temporal	  constituents	  change	  –	  they	  still	  present	  the	  same	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’	  constituted	  
by	  the	  same	  location	  S’	  and	  the	  same	  phenomenal	  time	  T’.	  The	  pixel	  as	  a	  fact	  is	  not	  re-­‐
peatable,	  but	  the	  pixel	  as	  a	  presentational	  function	   is	  repeatable	  since	  a	  given	  state	  of	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affairs	  F’	  can	  be	  presented	  by	  a	  series	  of	  facts	  (F1,	  F2,	  F3…)	  all	  working	  as	   if	  they	  were	  
the	  same	  pixel.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  pixel	  as	  a	  presentational	  function	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  
as	  an	  abstract	  type	  that	  presents	  a	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’	  by	  being	  instantiated	  by	  visu-­‐
al	  factual	  tokens	  (F1,	  F2,	  F3…).	  	  	  
The	  confusion	  between	  the	  pixel	  as	  a	  type	  and	  the	  tokens	  instantiating	  it	  is	  the	  onto-­‐
logical	  fallacy	  that	  leads	  Berys	  Gaut	  ([2010]:	  58)	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  digital	  pictures	  the	  pixel	  
is	  not	  a	  «minimal	  denotative	  unit»	  because	  «the	  parts	  of	  a	  pixel	  denote	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  
area	  of	  the	  object	  that	  the	  pixel	  denotes	  […]	   	  The	  denotation	  relation	  still	  holds	  at	  the	  
sub-­‐pixel	   level.	   The	   parts	   of	   a	   pixel	   do	   denote,	   unlike	   the	   parts	   of	   a	   word».	   In	   other	  
words,	  if	  we	  look	  closely	  at	  a	  pixel	  on	  the	  screen,	  then,	  according	  to	  Gaut,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  
small	  colored	  square	  that	  has	  colored	  parts	  denoting	  in	  their	  turn.	  But	  what	  we	  truly	  see	  
in	  looking	  closely	  at	  a	  pixel	  on	  the	  screen	  is	  not	  the	  pixel	  itself,	  but	  the	  token	  that	  instan-­‐
tiates	  it!	  Such	  a	  token	  is	  a	  small	  colored	  area	  having	  colored	  parts,	  but	  the	  pixel	  instanti-­‐
ated	  by	  this	  token	  is	  an	  elementary	  proposition	  having	  no	  parts	  at	  all.	  	  
The	  picture,	  as	  conjunction	  of	  pixels,	  can	  be	  conceived	  in	  its	  turn	  as	  an	  abstract	  type	  
instantiated	  by	  factual	  tokens.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  call	  such	  a	  type	  the	  picture’s	  design,	  
and	  I	  will	  call	  each	  of	  its	  factual	  tokens	  a	  picture’s	  experienced	  surface.	  Hence	  a	  picture	  
is	  an	  abstract	  design	  that	  presents	  a	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs,	  and	  that	  can	  be	  instantiated	  
by	  a	   series	  of	   surface-­‐facts.	   The	  design,	   so	  defined,	   is	   a	   visual	   array	   that	  mediates	  be-­‐
tween	  a	   visual	   fact	   (the	  picture's	   surface,	   by	  which	   the	  design	   is	   instantiated)	   a	   visual	  
state	  of	  affairs	  (the	  picture's	  subject,	  the	  depicted	  scene	  presented	  by	  the	  design).	  The	  
surface	   is	   in	   our	   actual	   spatio-­‐temporal	   environment,	   the	   scene	   is	   in	   another	   spatio-­‐
temporal	  environment,	  whereas	  the	  design,	  qua	  abstract	  type,	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  any	  
spatio-­‐temporal	  environment:	  it	  is	  just	  a	  structure	  of	  colored	  points.	  
Although	  a	  picture	  is	  made	  of	  pixels,	  we	  do	  not	  normally	  notice	  pixels	  while	  looking	  
at	  pictures.	  We	  normally	  grasp	  the	  picture’s	  meaning	  directly	  at	  the	  overall	  picture	  level	  
or	  at	  some	  intermediate	  level	  (e.g.,	  figures,	  details	  etc.).	  But	  we	  can	  grasp	  such	  a	  mean-­‐
ing	  just	  because	  the	  picture	  is	  composed	  by	  pixels.	  	  
The	   underlying	   level	   of	   pixels,	   which	   makes	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   picture	   noticeable,	  
normally	  is	  not	  noticeable	  itself.	  But	  it	  can	  be	  noticed	  when	  the	  viewer	  wants	  to	  extract	  
as	  much	  information	  as	  possible	  from	  the	  picture,	  and	  it	  can	  also	  be	  noticed	  when	  the	  
maker	   wants	   to	   control	   its	   picture	   at	   the	   most	   detailed	   level,	   as	   it	   often	   happens	   in	  
computer	  graphics	  practices.	  Although	  the	  pixel	  level	  is	  not	  noticed	  by	  usual	  viewers	  and	  
usual	  makers	  of	  pictures,	  it	  makes	  the	  depicted	  things	  noticeable,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  ultimate	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level	   at	  which	  depiction	   can	  be	  exploited	  both	  by	   the	  picture’s	  maker	   and	  by	   the	  pic-­‐
ture’s	  viewer.	  	  
A	  similar	  issue	  is	  discussed	  by	  Goodman	  in	  his	  account	  of	  the	  visual	  field	  as	  composed	  
by	  visual	  complexes	  constituted	  by	  spatial,	   temporal	  and	  chromatic	  qualia.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  Goodman	  ([1967]:	  261)	  admits	  that	  qualia	  are	  not	  normally	  noticeable	  by	  the	  sub-­‐
ject	  of	   the	  experience:	  «I	  am	  not	  suggesting	   that	   in	  actual	  experience	  we	   first	   take	   in-­‐
ventory	  of	  the	  specific	  qualia	  of	  an	  individual	  and	  then	  determine	  its	  size	  and	  shape	  by	  
counting	  these	  qualia	  and	  studying	  out	  their	  arrangement».	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Goodman	  ([1967]:	  263)	  suggests	  that	  the	  qualia	  ground	  the	  pos-­‐
sibility	  of	  every	  experience:	  	  
Whatever	  may	   be	   the	   original	   givens	   of	   experience,	   qualia	  may	   still	   be	   the	   elements	   into	  
which	  we	  ordinarily	  tend	  to	  dissect	  the	  content	  of	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  comprehend	  it	  ac-­‐
cording	  to	  a	  structural	  scheme	  that	  will	  be	  applicable	  to	  further	  experience.	  This	  would	  make	  
it	  easy	  to	  explain,	  for	  instance,	  the	  ready	  apprehension	  of	  shapes;	  for	  while	  the	  combination	  
of	  qualia	  in	  a	  certain	  presentation	  might	  be	  novel,	  the	  qualia	  themselves	  and	  their	  relations	  
within	  their	  several	  fixed	  arrays	  would	  be	  familiar.	  If	  new	  content	  is	  analyzed	  as	  a	  new	  com-­‐
bination	   of	   familiar	   and	   already	   ordered	   qualia,	   its	  whole	   structure	   becomes	   immediately	  
comprehensible;	  and	  this	  is	  quite	  consistent	  with	  our	  earlier	  observation	  that	  the	  pattern	  of	  
qualia	  in	  a	  presentation	  is	  often	  noticed	  before	  the	  several	  qualia	  themselves.	  
Pixels	  are	  constitutive	  elements	  not	  only	  of	  digital	  pictures	  (in	  which	  we	  can	  actually	  
distinguish	  discrete	  constitutive	  elements),	  but	  also	  of	  analogical	  photographic	  pictures,	  
since	  a	  traditional	  photo	  «is	  comprised	  of	  sometimes	  billions	  of	   individual	  grains	  […]	  In	  
this	  respect	  there	  is	  also	  an	  array	  of	  picture	  elements	  in	  the	  traditional	  photograph,	  al-­‐
beit	  one	  with	  vastly	  more	  elements	  than	  is	  usual	   in	  digital	  photographs,	  and	  which	  are	  
not	  arrayed	  in	  a	  grid.	  Keep	  on	  enlarging	  such	  a	  photograph,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  one	  will	  see	  
individual	  grains,	  from	  which	  the	  object	  is	  not	  recognizable,	  even	  though	  the	  grains	  de-­‐
note	  parts	  of	  the	  object»	  (Gaut	  [2010:	  59).	  In	  this	  sense	  even	  a	  painting	  can	  be	  consid-­‐
ered	  as	  composed	  by	  pixels	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  microscopic	  level	  at	  which	  we	  
have	  no	  more	  painted	  areas	  but	  rather	  individual	  grains	  of	  paint.	  	  
In	  his	  paper	  Digital	  Pictures,	   Sampling,	  and	  Vagueness:	  The	  Ontology	  of	  Digital	  Pic-­‐
tures,	  John	  Zeimbekis	  ([2012]:	  51)	  shows	  how	  an	  appropriate	  technology	  could	  allow	  us	  
to	  produces	  different	  instances	  of	  a	  given	  picture	  that	  are	  all	  «phenomenally	  identical	  in	  
respect	  of	  color,	   shape,	  and	  size»,	  namely,	   that	   instantiate	   the	  same	  type.	  Technology	  
already	  allows	  us	  to	  do	  that	  for	  digital	  pictures,	  and	  nothing	  prevents	  us	  to	  do	  the	  same	  
in	  the	  future	  with	  the	  other	  kinds	  of	  pictures:	  «what	  allows	  digital	  pictures	  to	  be	  types	  is	  
not	   so	  much	   their	   dependence	   on	   binary-­‐code	   representations	   as	   it	   is	   the	   technology	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that	  manipulates	  subphenomenal	  quantities.	  This,	   jointly	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  autography	  
is	  not	  necessary	  for	  pictures,	  suggests	  that	  by	  using	  the	  same	  principles	  [...]	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  make	  type-­‐identical	  paintings	  and	  analog	  photographs»	  (Zeimbekis	  [2012]:	  51).	  
4.	  Standard	  of	  Correctness	  	  
Why	  are	  some	  visual	  facts	  pictures	  while	  others	  are	  not?	  What	  makes	  a	  visual	  fact	  a	  pic-­‐
ture?	  Tractatus	  ontology	  and	  semantics	  –	  interpreted	  according	  to	  Frascolla’s	  hypothesis	  
–	  do	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  wholly	  answer	  these	  questions.	  	  
In	  principle,	  every	   fact,	   that	   is,	  every	  phenomenal	  complex	   in	   the	  visual	   field,	  could	  
be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  picture	  representing	  a	  given	  state	  of	  affairs.	  For	  example,	  the	  white	  
wall	  in	  front	  of	  me	  could	  be	  interpreted	  not	  only	  as	  a	  mere	  fact	  constituted	  by	  the	  com-­‐
bination	  of	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  qualia	  and	  white	  qualia,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  pictorial	  fact	  pre-­‐
senting	   a	   given	   state	   of	   affairs	   (the	   combination	   of	   other	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   qualia	  
with	   the	   same	  white	  qualia,	   composing	   for	   instance	  a	  blanket	  of	   snow).	  That	   is	   to	   say	  
that	  the	  mere	  phenomenology	  of	  an	  experience	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  distinguish	  in	  prin-­‐
ciple	  between	  mere	  visual	  facts	  and	  pictures.	  We	  need	  to	  refer	  to	  intentions,	  concepts,	  
histories	  of	  production,	  standards	  of	  correctness,	  norms,	  practices,	  agreements.	  In	  other	  
words,	  we	  need	  to	   temporary	   leave	   the	  Tractatus	  and	   to	  address	   the	  Philosophical	   In-­‐
vestigations.	  	  
Yet	   temporary	   leaving	  does	  not	  mean	  definitively	   giving	  up.	   In	   the	  Wittgensteinian	  
account	  of	  depiction	  I	  am	  proposing,	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  does	  not	  work	  as	  a	  
confutation	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  but	  rather	  as	   its	  completion.	  We	  can	  apply	  to	  pictures-­‐as-­‐
such	  Kenny’s	  ([1973]:	  179)	  point	  about	  propositions-­‐as-­‐pictures:	  	  
One	  of	   the	  rare	  remarks	   in	  the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	  explicitly	  about	  the	  proposition	  
as	  a	  picture	  takes	  up	  this	  point.	  ‘Thinking	  of	  a	  proposition	  as	  a	  word-­‐picture	  of	  the	  facts	  has	  
something	  misleading	  about	  it:	  one	  tends	  to	  think	  only	  of	  such	  pictures	  as	  hang	  on	  our	  walls:	  
which	  seem	  simply	  to	  portray	  how	  a	  thing	  looks,	  what	  it	  is	  like.	  These	  pictures	  are	  as	  it	  were	  
idle’	  (PI,	  i,	  291;	  Z	  244).	  All	  these	  passages	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  picture	  theory	  needs	  sup-­‐
plementing,	  rather	  than	  that	   it	   is	  false;	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning	  as	  use	  is	  a	  complement	  
rather	   than	   a	   rival	   to	   the	   picture	   theory.	   They	   stress	   the	   point,	   so	   often	  made	   since	   the	  
1930s,	  that	  the	  signs	  by	  themselves	  are	  dead	  and	  need	  the	  use	  to	  give	  them	  life.	  
That	  being	  the	  case,	  what	   is	  the	  use	  that	  can	  make	  a	  «dead	  picture»	  alive?	  We	  can	  
try	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  by	  combining	  Tractatus'	  picture	  theory	  with	  Philosophical	  In-­‐
vestigations'	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  a	  «dead	  picture»	  alive,	  we	  need	  a	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practice	  –	  we	  could	  call	  it	  «the	  depiction	  game»	  –	  allowing	  practitioners	  to	  (explicitly	  or	  
at	  least	  implicitly)	  make	  the	  following	  moves.	  	  
I)	  Signaling	  that	  a	  given	  visual	  fact	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  fact	  but	  a	  special	  pictorial	  fact	  that	  
has	  been	  intentionally	  realized	  in	  order	  to	  instantiate	  a	  design	  presenting	  a	  visual	  state	  
of	  affairs.	  In	  our	  culture	  the	  picture	  frame	  is	  a	  ordinary	  pragmatic	  device	  allowing	  us	  to	  
distinguish	  pictorial	  facts	  from	  mere	  visual	  facts,	  but	  often	  it	   is	  simply	  the	  coupling	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  picture's	  content	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  exposed	  that	  allows	  the	  viewer	  
to	  recognize	  the	  picture	  as	  a	  picture.	  Yet	  the	  content	  on	  its	  own	  –	  without	  the	  coupling	  
with	  the	  context	  –	  is	  not	  sufficient	  in	  principle	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  the	  picture	  from	  a	  
mere	  visual	  fact,	  as	  suggested	  for	  example	  by	  the	  case	  of	  trompe-­‐l'oeil,	  by	  the	  two	  Ma-­‐
gritte's	  paintings	  called	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  and	  especially	  by	  Arthur	  Danto's	  ([1981]:	  
1)	  thought	  experiment	  about	  the	  various	  indiscernible	  red	  canvas,	  among	  which	  there	  is	  
also	  the	  depictive	  painting	  Red	  Table	  Cloth,	  «a	  still-­‐life	  executed	  by	  an	  embittered	  disci-­‐
ple	  of	  Matisse».	  
II)	  Indicating,	  with	  a	  certain	  approximation,	  which	  are	  the	  spatial	  location	  S’	  and	  the	  
time	  T’	  constituting	  the	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  the	  picture	  (this	  latter	  being	  
conceived	  of	  –	  according	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  –	  as	  a	  visual	  fact	  situated	  in	  spatial	  location	  S	  
and	  time	  T	  but	  capable	  of	  presenting	  a	  different	  state	  of	  affairs	  situated	  in	  S'	  and	  T').	  At	  
least,	  the	  maker	  has	  to	  indicate	  whether	  the	  presented	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  claimed	  to	  sub-­‐
sist	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  or	  in	  a	  certain	  fictional	  world.	  In	  principle,	  the	  picture's	  content	  
does	  not	  allow	  the	  viewer	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  former	  or	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  case.	  Yet	  
this	   is	   the	  basic	   requirement	   in	  order	   to	  make	  a	  move	   in	   the	  depiction	  game.	  Without	  
this	  indication,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  options,	  both	  unsatisfying.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  could	  
presuppose	  that	  a	  state	  of	  affair	  can	  only	  exists	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  so	  that	  a	  picture	  just	  
says:	  «in	  the	  actual	  world,	  this	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  exists»;	  but	  this	  presupposition	  has	  
the	  unsound	  consequence	  that	  fictional	  pictures	  are	  just	  a	  pile	  of	  lies	  without	  any	  sense.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  assume	  that	  a	  picture	  just	  says:	  «in	  some	  possible	  world,	  
this	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  subsists»;	  but	  for	  every	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  we	  can	  conceive	  
of	   a	   possible	   world	   in	   which	   it	   subsists;	   so,	   depictively	   speaking,	   such	   a	   picture	   says	  
nothing;	  it	  cannot	  counts	  as	  a	  move	  in	  the	  depiction	  game;	  it	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  Tracta-­‐
tus,	  a	  mere	  tautology.	  	  
III)	  Sharing	  a	   conceptual	   framework	  allowing	   the	   viewer	   to	   recognize	   the	   things	   in-­‐
tended	  by	  the	  maker	  in	  the	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  the	  picture.	  The	  picture's	  
title	  is	  the	  typical	  pragmatic	  device	  used	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  this	  move,	  though	  often	  the	  
mere	  sharing	  of	  the	  same	  socio-­‐historical	  context	  allows	  the	  viewer	  to	  rightly	  recognize	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the	  depictive	  intentions	  of	  the	  maker	  by	  simply	  looking	  at	  the	  picture.	  Yet	  there	  are	  cas-­‐
es,	  for	  example	  the	  use	  of	  a	  picture	  to	  carry	  out	  singular	  reference,	  in	  which	  the	  maker	  
has	  to	  provide	  the	  viewer	  with	  further	  information:	  otherwise,	  «since	  picture	  perception	  
in	  itself	  gives	  no	  information	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  depictum	  in	  objective	  space,	  but	  
only	  appearance-­‐based,	  qualitative	  information,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  epistemic	  resources	  
left	  with	  which	  to	  exclude	  multiple	  reference»	  (Zeimbekis	  [2010]:	  15).	  	  
These	   three	   kinds	   of	   move	   give	   us	   a	   standard	   of	   correctness	   providing	   a	   minimal	  
amount	  of	  normativity	  that	  according	  to	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  is	  the	  basic	  requirement	  
for	   something	   to	   have	  meaning.	   Scholars	   like	  Wollheim	   (1987),	  Hopkins	   (1998),	   Lopes	  
(1996),	  Newall	  (2011)	  –	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  their	  mainly	  perceptual	  accounts	  of	  pictures	  
–	  have	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  standard	  of	  correctness	   is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  depic-­‐
tion,	  and	  have	  tried	  to	  make	   it	  explicit	  either	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  maker's	   intentions	  (Woll-­‐
heim,	   Hopkins)	   or	   in	   terms	   of	   causal	   processes	   (Lopes),	   or	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   both	  
(Newall).	  Yet,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Brandom's	  ([1994]:	  13-­‐18)	  pragmatic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
later	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  standard	  of	  correctness	  for	  pictures	  could	  be	  better	  specified	  in	  
terms	  of	  a	  socio-­‐historical	  practice	  instituting	  a	  depiction	  game.	  Such	  a	  game	  has	  not	  be	  
confused	  with	  Goodman's	   (1968)	  account	  of	  pictures	  as	  belonging	   to	  a	   special	   symbol	  
system,	  nor	  with	  Walton's	   (1990)	  games	  of	  make-­‐believe.	  The	   former	   indeed	   relies	  on	  
conventions,	  the	  latter	  on	  imagination,	  whereas	  the	  depiction	  game	  is	  essentially	  relying	  
on	  perception.	  	  
That	  is	  because,	  making	  a	  picture	  counts	  as	  a	  move	  in	  the	  depiction	  game	  that	  com-­‐
mits	  the	  maker	  to	  the	  claim	  that	   in	  a	  certain	  world	  there	   is	  a	  certain	  visual	  state	  of	  af-­‐
fairs	  in	  which	  we	  can	  recognize	  certain	  things.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  viewer	  can	  assess	  
this	   claim	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  picture.	  But	  how	  can	  she	  carry	  out	   this	  assessment?	  Once	  
again,	   the	   complementarity	   of	   the	   Tractatus	   and	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations	   –	   in	  
this	   specific	   case,	   the	   complementarity	   of	   the	   picture	   theory	   and	   the	   noticing-­‐aspects	  
theory	  –	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  address	  the	  question.	  	  
5.	  Noticing	  Aspects	  
Wittgenstein’s	   considerations	   about	   noticing	   aspects	   and	   seeing-­‐as	   (PI,	   part	   II,	   section	  
XI)	  outline	  an	  account	  of	   the	  pictorial	  experience	  that	  can	  be	  developed	   in	  the	   light	  of	  
the	  Tractarian	  distinction	  between	  facts	  (the	  picture’s	  surface	  as	  a	  mere	  visual	  complex	  
experienced	  in	  the	  visual	  field)	  and	  depicting	  facts	  (the	  picture’s	  design	  as	  the	  presenta-­‐
tion	  of	  a	  different	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs).	  Wittgenstein	  ([1953]:	  193)	   introduces	  the	  no-­‐
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tion	  of	  «noticing	  aspects»	  in	  general:	  «I	  contemplate	  a	  face,	  and	  then	  suddenly	  notice	  its	  
likeness	  to	  another.	   I	  see	  that	   it	  has	  not	  changed;	  and	  yet	   I	  see	   it	  differently.	   I	  call	  this	  
experience	  ‘noticing	  an	  aspect’».	  Then	  Wittgenstein	  ([1953]:	  196)	  applies	  this	  notion	  to	  
pictures:	  «I	  suddenly	  see	  the	  solution	  of	  a	  puzzle-­‐picture.	  Before,	   there	  were	  branches	  
there;	  now	  there	  is	  a	  human	  shape.	  My	  visual	  impression	  has	  changed	  and	  now	  I	  recog-­‐
nize	  that	  it	  has	  not	  only	  shape	  and	  colour	  but	  also	  a	  quite	  particular	  ‘organization’».	  	  
Finding	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  picture-­‐puzzle	  amounts	  to	  determining	  which	   is	  the	  par-­‐
ticular	  organization,	  but	  just	  looking	  for	  a	  solution	  already	  entails	  that	  the	  picture’s	  sur-­‐
face	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  special	  visual	  fact	  presenting	  another	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  we	  
have	   to	   recognize	  «a	  quite	  particular	  organization».	  There	   is	  a	   fundamental	  difference	  
between	  ordinary	  cases	  of	  noticing	  aspects	  and	  the	  pictorial	  ones:	  in	  the	  former	  we	  no-­‐
tice	  aspects	  in	  the	  visual	  facts	  we	  see,	  in	  the	  latter	  we	  notice	  aspects	  in	  the	  visual	  states	  
of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  the	  visual	  facts	  we	  see.	  	  
In	   this	   sense	   the	   Tractarian	   distinction	   between	   mere	   facts	   and	   depicting	   facts	  
grounds	   the	  depiction’s	   theory	  outlined	   in	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations.	   In	  order	   to	  
see	  the	  picture-­‐puzzle	  as	  a	  human	  face,	  I	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  picture-­‐surface’s	  shapes	  
and	  colours	  as	  a	  visual	  design	  presenting	  something	  else.	   I	  have	   to	   treat	   the	  combina-­‐
tions	  of	  spatial,	  temporal	  and	  chromatic	  qualia	  constituting	  the	  surface	  in	  my	  visual	  field	  
as	  pixels	  presenting	  the	  combinations	  of	  other	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  qualia	  with	  the	  cor-­‐
responding	  chromatic	  qualia.	  The	  conjunction	  of	  these	  pixels	  individuates	  the	  picture	  as	  
a	  design.	  Solving	  the	  picture-­‐puzzle	  consists	   in	  experiencing	  this	  design	  as	  presenting	  a	  
combination	  of	  phenomenal	  qualia,	  and	  in	  interpreting	  this	  combination	  as	  a	  given	  thing	  
recognized	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  application	  of	  a	  concept	  (at	  least,	  an	  elementary	  concept	  like	  
«the	  thing	  that	  normally	  causes	  such	  a	  combination	  of	  phenomenal	  qualia»).	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  «noticing	  aspects»	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  characterize	  depiction.	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  is	  very	  explicit	  about	  this	  point.	  We	  can	  «notice	  aspects»	  also	  in	  ordinary	  visual	  ex-­‐
perience:	  «I	  meet	  someone	  whom	  I	  have	  not	  seen	  for	  years;	  I	  see	  him	  clearly,	  but	  fail	  to	  
know	  him.	   Suddenly	   I	   know	  him,	   I	   see	   the	   old	   face	   in	   the	   altered	   one»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1953]:	   197).	   Yet	   there	   is	   a	   crucial	   difference	   between	   «ordinary	   notice	   aspects»	   and	  
«pictorial	  notice	  aspects».	  The	  former	   is	  an	   interpretation	  of	   (the	  application	  of	  a	  con-­‐
cept	  to)	  a	  fact	  F,	  that	  is,	  a	  visual	  complex	  F	  directly	  experienced	  in	  the	  visual	  field:	  I	  meet	  
someone	  and	  I	  match	  his	  face	  with	  the	  visual	  concept	  of	  an	  old	  friend’s	  face.	  The	  latter	  is	  
an	  interpretation	  of	  (the	  application	  of	  a	  concept	  to)	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’	  presented	  by	  a	  
fact	  F:	  I	  apply	  a	  concept	  to	  a	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  F’	  presented	  by	  a	  visual	  complex	  F	  di-­‐
rectly	  experienced	  in	  my	  visual	  field.	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In	  order	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  ordinary	  noticing	  aspects	  and	  the	  pictorial	  one,	  
we	  need	   the	  Tractarian	  distinction	  between	  mere	   facts	  and	  states	  of	  affairs	  presented	  
by	  pictorial	  facts.	  The	  act	  of	  noticing	  aspects	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  cases,	  but	  it	  applies	  to	  
different	  ontological	  domains:	  mere	  visual	   facts	   in	  the	  ordinary	  noticing	  aspects,	  visual	  
states	  of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  pictorial	  facts	  in	  the	  pictorial	  noticing	  aspects.	  	  
I	   look	  at	  a	  picture.	   If	   I	  see	   it	  as	  a	  mere	  surface,	  then	  its	  points	  of	  colors	  belong	  to	  a	  
space	  that	  is	  my	  space	  and	  to	  a	  time	  that	  is	  my	  time.	  But	  if	  I	  see	  it	  as	  a	  depiction,	  then	  its	  
points	  of	  colors	  belong	  to	  a	  space	  that	  is	  not	  my	  space,	  and	  to	  a	  time	  that	  is	  not	  my	  time.	  
Indeed,	  they	  belong	  to	  the	  space	  and	  time	  of	  the	  depicted	  scene.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  visually	  
experience	  that	  space	  and	  that	  time,	  and	  I	  try	  to	  apply	  my	  visual	  concepts	  to	  the	  color	  
distribution	  experienced	  in	  such	  a	  space-­‐time	  different	  from	  my	  actual	  one.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  every	  picture	  works	  as	  a	  puzzle-­‐picture.	  Normally	  we	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  
this	  since	  our	  minds	  are	  so	  fast	  in	  applying	  concepts	  that	  we	  do	  not	  realize	  that	  we	  are	  
applying	  these	  concepts	  to	  a	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  the	  picture’s	  design	  ra-­‐
ther	  than	  directly	  to	  the	  picture’s	  surface	  as	  a	  fact	  in	  our	  visual	  field.	  Nevertheless,	  when	  
we	  recognize	  a	  thing	  in	  a	  picture,	  we	  do	  not	  place	  this	  thing	  in	  our	  environment,	  but	  in	  a	  
peculiar	  pictorial	  space,	  and	  making	  this	  move	  requires	  that	  we	  implicitly	  conceive	  of	  the	  
picture	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  fact	  in	  our	  visual	  field	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  different	  visual	  state	  of	  af-­‐
fairs	  presented	  by	  means	  of	  this	  visual	  fact.	  	  
6.	  Seeing-­‐in	  	  
In	  developing	  Philosophical	  Investigations’	  insights	  about	  pictures,	  Wollheim	  proposes	  to	  
explain	  depiction	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinctive	  experience	  that	  he	  calls	  «seeing-­‐in»:	  	  
Seeing-­‐in	   is	   a	   natural	   capacity	  we	   have	   –	   it	   precedes	   pictures,	   though	   pictures	   foster	   it	   –	  
which	   allows	   us,	   when	   confronted	   by	   certain	   differentiated	   surfaces,	   to	   have	   experiences	  
that	  possess	  a	  dual	  aspect,	  or	  “twofoldness,”	  so	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  
differentiation	  of	  the	  surface,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  observe	  something	  in	  front	  of,	  or	  
behind,	  something	  else	  (Wollheim	  [1993]:	  188).	  	  
Hence,	  in	  the	  seeing-­‐in	  experience,	  the	  viewer	  relates	  to	  a	  picture	  along	  two	  dimen-­‐
sions:	   a	   configurational	   fold	   representing	   the	  picture’s	   surface	   as	   such,	   and	   a	   recogni-­‐
tional	  fold	  representing	  the	  depicted	  scene.	  These	  two	  folds	  constitute	  the	  peculiar	  two-­‐
foldness	  of	  the	  seeing-­‐in	  experience.	  Unlike	  Gombrich's	  (1960)	  account	  of	  seeing-­‐as,	   in	  
which	  the	  experience	  of	  surface	  and	  that	  of	  the	  depicted	  subject	  can	  only	  alternate	  (like	  
the	  experience	  of	   the	  duck	  and	  that	  of	   the	  rabbit	   in	   Jastrow's	  picture,	  cf.	  Wittgenstein	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[1953]:	  194),	   in	  Wollheim's	  account	  of	   seeing-­‐in	   the	   two	  experiential	   folds	  are	  concur-­‐
rent.	  	  	  
Wollheim’s	  theory	  has	  a	  great	  explicative	  power	  and	  strongly	  affects	  the	  contempo-­‐
rary	   philosophical	   debate	   about	   depiction	   (cf.	   Lopes	   1996,	   Hopkins	   1998,	   Abell	   and	  
Bantinaki	  2010).	  Yet	  Wollheim’s	  theory	  also	  raises	  an	  important	  problem	  that	  its	  follow-­‐
ers	   find	   it	  hard	   to	  solve	   (cf.	  Budd	  1992):	  how	  can	  we	  satisfactory	  characterize	   the	  two	  
folds	   of	   the	   seeing-­‐in	   experience?	   Assuming	   that	  we	   concurrently	   represent	   both	   the	  
depicting	  surface	  and	  the	  depicting	  scene,	  how	  do	  we	  represent	  the	  surface?	  How	  do	  we	  
represent	  the	  scene?	  	  
A	   joint	   reading	  of	   the	  considerations	  about	  pictures	   in	   the	  Tractatus	   and	   the	  Philo-­‐
sophical	  Investigations	  gives	  us	  useful	  insights	  in	  order	  to	  address	  these	  questions.	  	  
Both	  the	  configurational	  fold	  and	  the	  recognitional	  one	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  notic-­‐
ing-­‐aspects	  tasks	  described	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations.	  In	  the	  configurational	  fold	  
the	  viewer	  notices	  the	  picture’s	  surface,	  its	  differentiation,	  the	  marks	  placed	  on	  it.	  In	  the	  
recognitional	  fold,	  the	  viewer	  notices	  the	  things	  represented	  in	  the	  picture	  by	  applying	  
the	  appropriate	  concepts.	  	  
Yet	  in	  order	  to	  individuate	  the	  crucial	  difference	  between	  the	  configurational	  and	  the	  
recognitional	  folds,	  we	  need	  the	  Tractatus	  picture’s	  theory.	  The	  two	  folds	  of	  the	  pictorial	  
experience	   apply	   indeed	   their	   noticing-­‐aspects	   tasks	   to	   different	   visual	   structures.	   On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  the	  configurational	  fold	  applies	  to	  the	  picture	  as	  a	  fact	  in	  the	  visual	  field:	  a	  
visual	  complex	  constituted	  by	  chromatic	  qualia,	   spatial	  qualia	  and	   temporal	  qualia.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  the	  recognitional	  fold	  applies	  to	  the	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  presented	  by	  
this	  fact:	  a	  different	  visual	  complex	  constituted	  by	  the	  same	  chromatic	  qualia	  but	  other	  
spatial	  qualia	  and	  temporal	  qualia.	  Here	   is	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  folds:	  
the	  different	  ontological	  substrata	  of	  their	  phenomenology.	  Wittgenstein’s	  picture	  theo-­‐
ry	  of	  pictures	  leads	  back	  the	  epistemological	  question	  (how	  do	  we	  understand	  pictures?)	  
to	  the	  ontological	  question	  (what	  are	  pictures?).	   It	  allows	  us	  to	  better	  address	  the	  for-­‐
mer	  by	  answering	  the	  latter.	  	  
7.	  Seeing-­‐as	  	  
In	  order	   to	  account	   for	   the	   the	  picture	  as	  a	  visual	  proposition,	  we	  have	  observed	   that	  
the	  relation	  between	  the	  picture's	  surface	  and	  the	  depicted	  scene	  is	  mediated	  by	  an	  ab-­‐
stract	  type,	  a	  visual	  array,	  a	  structure	  of	  points	  of	  color	  that	  we	  have	  called	  the	  picture's	  
design.	  Although	  the	  picture's	  design	  is	  an	  abstract	  type,	  it	  can	  be	  perceived	  by	  attend-­‐
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ing	  to	  the	  picture's	  surface,	  like	  a	  musical	  work	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  abstract	  type	  can	  be	  
perceived	  by	  attending	   to	   its	  performances	   (cf.	  Dodd	   [2006]:	  11-­‐16):	  «in	   listening	   to	  a	  
symphony	   one	   hears	   two	   things	   at	   once,	   the	   symphony	   and	   a	   performance	   thereof»	  
(Wolterstorff	  [1980]:	  41).	  Since	  a	  picture,	  unlike	  a	  symphony,	  normally	  also	  has	  a	  repre-­‐
sentational	  content,	  in	  looking	  at	  a	  picture	  one	  can	  see	  three	  things	  at	  once:	  its	  surface,	  
its	  design	  and	  its	  depicted	  scene.	  	  
Seeing-­‐in	  probably	  provides	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  experi-­‐
ence	  of	   the	   picture's	   surface	   (the	   visual	   fact	   F	   directly	   experienced	   in	   our	   visual	   field)	  
and	  that	  of	  the	  depicted	  scene	  (the	  scene	  recognized	  in	  the	  visual	  state	  of	  affairs	  F'	  pre-­‐
sented	  by	  the	  picture’s	  surface).	  Yet	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  
the	  picture's	  design	  and	  that	  of	  the	  depicted	  scene,	  the	  best	  explanation	  should	  be	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  design	  as	  a	  visual	  array	  has	  its	  colored	  points	  all	  on	  the	  same	  
plane,	  whereas	  in	  visually	  recognizing	  the	  depicted	  scene	  we	  have	  to	  perceive	  these	  very	  
points	  as	  three-­‐dimensionally	  organized.	   In	  order	  to	  see	  all	  the	  colored	  points	  of	  a	  pic-­‐
ture	  on	  the	  same	  plane,	  as	  if	  the	  picture	  be	  a	  colored	  map,	  you	  need	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
perceptual	  switch	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  perceive	  the	  duck	  rather	  than	  the	  rabbit	  in	  the	  Ja-­‐
strow's	   picture.	   You	   can	   not	   concurrently	   perceive	   the	   visual	   structure	   (the	   «colored	  
map»)	  and	  the	  depicted	  scene:	  you	  can	  only	  alternately	  perceive	  them.	  	  
Such	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  picture's	  visual	  structure	  as	  a	  colored	  map	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  
picture	  aesthetic	  appreciation,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  case	  of	  paintings,	  since	   it	  corresponds	  to	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  painter	  viewed	  the	  picture	  while	  making	  it.	  How	  can	  we	  take	  it	  into	  
account?	  Once	  again,	  the	  Tractatus	  ontology	  allows	  us	  to	  address	  a	  perceptual	  issue,	  by	  
showing	  that	  a	  picture	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  surface	  representing	  a	  scene,	  but	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  vis-­‐
ual	   fact	   (the	   surface)	   instantiating	   an	   abstract	   type	   (the	   design)	   that	   presents	   a	   visual	  
state	  of	  affairs	   (in	  which	  we	  could	  recognize	  the	  depicted	  scene).	  Wollheim's	  seeing-­‐in	  
can	  take	  into	  account	  the	  concurrent	  experiences	  of	  the	  scene	  and	  of	  the	  surface,	  but	  in	  
order	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  alternation	  between	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  scene	  and	  that	  
of	  the	  design,	  we	  need	  Gombrich's	  seeing-­‐as.	  We	  need	  two	  distinct	  ways	  of	  perceiving	  
since	  depiction	  involves	  two	  distinct	  relations	  to	  be	  experienced:	  that	  between	  the	  sur-­‐
face	  and	  the	  scene,	  and	  that	  between	  the	  design	  and	  the	  scene.	  That	  is	  why	  both	  seeing-­‐
in	  and	  seeing-­‐as	  contribute	  to	  explain	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  given	  picture.	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